Cycles in initial public offer (IPO) 
Introduction
h r on sam W ile the pricing on initial public offerings (IPOs) has received significant esearch attention internationally, the majority of empirical work has focused ples of industrial IPOs or combined samples of industrial and resourcebased IPOs, with relatively few studies isolating resource-based IPOs (RBIPOs), a notable exception being How (2000) examining short and long run mining IPOs in Australia over the period 1979 to 1990.
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The need to explore 'clinically' Australian resource-based offers stems from the fact that they are characteristically different from their industrial counterparts, 2 and also a full investigation of this industry sector forms a control sample that holds the changes in risk composition in listing relatively constant. Resource firms are generally more speculative in nature, often more difficult to value, and the volatility of cash flows are subject to changes in commodity prices, which are also observed but disregarded in most IPO analyses. Further, RBIPOs have been regarded as an important influence in estimating the level of underpricing internationally, as high periods of IPO underpricing have been accompanied by high numbers of resource IPOs seeking exchange listing (see , Loughran, Ritter & Rydqvist 1994 . Since then, it has been noted that cycles in both the volume and the average IPO initial returns exist (see Ibbotson & Ritter 1995 ). Ritter's preliminary explanation for this phenomenon was based on observations that high-risk IPOs are underpriced considerably more than low-risk offerings, arguing that large variations in average underpricing over long time horizons appear to be caused by the 'changing risk composition' hypothesis, where unusually large fractions of high-risk firms simultaneously seek new primary equity. However, the amplitude of the cycles in average returns was far larger than could be accounted for by the changing risk composition hypothesis alone. 3 Furthermore, there was a tremendous disparity in the relationship between monthly average initial returns of natural resource versus non-natural resource-based shares. Thus, the changing risk hypothesis is at best only a partial explanation of the hot issue phenomenon. This is because underlying resource-specific risk factors such as changes in commodity prices, the type of activities resource-based firms undertake, and, the firm's chosen level of diversification across minerals/metals have been largely overlooked in previous research. 4 The importance of these resource-specific influences along with traditional risk factors affecting the level of underpricing is empirically established in this paper. We examine three traditional risk factors 5 commonly advanced as explanatory variables for the level of IPO underpricing (namely ex-ante uncertainty, firm size and period of subscription), a measure of the changing risk composition (proxied by the proportion of resource to total IPOs in a given calendar month), and, three resource-specific risk factors (namely the change in commodity prices, an explorer-producer classification, and the level of commodity diversification).
The availability of commodity prices permits an exploration of the relationship between price variation in the underlying physical commodity market and the offer price at the time of listing. This factor is believed by analysts to significantly influence shareholders' returns in the resource sector. As public information, commodity prices are expected to reflect the commodity price risk assumed by new subscribers at, or close to, the time of the offering. Similarly, the issuing firm's activities provide information about the certainty of future cash flows in terms of timing and magnitude. Commodity 'producers' are generally more established firms and by extracting the commodity, receive cash flows. Consequently, producers are expected to have greater certainty in cash flows compared with 'explorers', which face highly unpredictable cash flows. Finally, the number of metals and minerals explored or produced provides a direct measure of commodity diversification. A focused operation can concentrate on economies of scale, but the cash flows of the firm are highly correlated with the performance of that commodity. On the other hand, a firm with interests in a large number of commodities is likely to have less variability in the firm's overall cash flow, particularly if the prices of individual commodities are relatively uncorrelated.
The analysis proceeds in two steps. First, relative underpricing levels for Australian industrial versus RBIPOs is reported intertemporally. Second, the impact of traditional risk, changing risk composition and specific resource-related risk factors in initial price determination is investigated over the period March 1983 to January 1990. In particular, the specific resource-based risk factors employed include: the change in commodity prices; the nature of the activities of the firm (producer versus explorer) and the level of commodity diversification. Patterns or trends are analysed by employing a switching regression technique as advocated by Goldfeld and Quandt (1972) to assess if there are consistent cycles in the pattern of initial returns. This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the distinguishing features of the Australian issuing process and institutional detail. Section 3 provides a discussion of IPO underpricing and reviews the identified risk factors.
4. Loughran & Ritter (2000) advance a behavioural rationale for hot markets. A prospect theory explanation is couched in terms of a bargaining model where firms are prepared to give up a greater proportion of net issue proceeds when market demand for the stock during the road show is strong. The authors argue that underpricing is a rational economic outcome based on the behaviour of the founders of the firm, because their personal wealth from floating improves significantly upon listing. However, given the data availability, such propositions cannot be tested. 5. Industry effects are controlled for but as our sample deals specifically with the resource sector it has been ignored.
The method employed and sample characteristics are considered in section 4. Results are presented in section 5 and section 6 concludes.
The Issuing Process and Institutional Detail
In Australia, it is common practice for a firm to raise first time equity capital via an IPO and simultaneously apply for official stock exchange listing. This process is referred to as the 'issue-cum-listing process'. 6 One distinguishing feature of the Australian market, prior to the adoption of book-building in 1993, was that the setting of the offer price takes place approximately 4-8 weeks prior to listing (see Curtis 1997) and is disclosed in the prospectus.
7 The significant time lag (approximately 45 days) between prospectus registration and listing of the firm in Australia is an institutional feature remarkably different from U.S. practices where issues are pre-sold via book-building. Potential subscribers are asked how many shares they would subscribe for with reference to a bid-range with the final offer price determined 1-2 days before listing. In comparison, an Australian issuer is locked into a fixed subscription price well in advance of listing and bears a significantly higher risk of failing to meet full subscription as a result of adverse movements in the stock market.
8
To reduce the apparent risk of failing to raise equity capital, underwriters are engaged in large IPOs. In Australia, a standby agreement is used where in the event that the IPO does not reach full subscription within a certain period, the underwriter agrees to take up the subscription shortfall at an agreed price.
9 Thus, the risk associated with the IPO (that is, undersubscription) is borne by the underwriter and this means that the firm can contractually guarantee the value of net proceeds raised (based on the number of shares issued multiplied by the offer price less the underwriting and flotation costs).
10 Woo (2000) observes in a sample of 906 Australian IPOs listing from January 1983 to June 1995 that 83% were underwritten. This rate of underwriter adoption is lower than the evidence reported in the U.S. where almost all issues are underwritten.
In the subsequent section, traditional factors identified in prior literature believed to influence the degree of underpricing are examined along with specific 6. First referred to by Finn and Higham (1988), p 16. 7 . Under the Corporations Act (1990), a broad provision is stipulated where a person may not offer for subscription / purchase or issue an invitation to subscribe for or buy securities of a corporation unless a prospectus has been prepared, lodged and registered by the Australian Securities Commission. However, exemptions for issuing a prospectus exist for large issues to institutional investors and personal offers to less than 20 people in a 12 month period. Exemptions for registration apply to a class of securities already listed on the Australian Stock Exchange and prescribed interests issued to exempt recipients or certain employees. 8. Since 1992, there has been a trend towards tiered equity offers which consist of a multi-part offer to raise funds from two or more defined sectors such as: institutions, the public, current private shareholders (entitlement) and employees. These joint arrangements usually have different conditions set for each sector and it has become widely accepted that the public offer is a fixed price-usually fixed quantity arrangement which closes before the institutional offer. 9. p 336. 10. The standby method in Australia is similar in kind to the firm commitment form of underwriting contract predominately used in the United States. Both methods guarantee the firm the total capital funds, however, in the firm commitment method, the underwriter purchases the issue and is then permitted to on sell it, rather than taking up any shortfall after the offer closes as in the standby method.
resource-based risk characteristics. The relative importance of these factors is assessed in the empirical analysis in terms of the correlation with level of resourcebased IPO underpricing.
Development of the Factors Influencing the Pricing of RBIPOs.

Traditional Factors
In an attempt to explain the level of underpricing, the IPO literature has identified a number of factors used to proxy the risk of a firm that has recently issued new primary equity. These traditional risk factors can be categorised as ex-ante uncertainty 11 and firm size. 3.1.1 Ex-Ante Uncertainty There appears to be considerable empirical support for the hypothesis that a positive relationship exists between ex-ante uncertainty and the level of underpricing. Several proxies have been used in previous studies exploring the association between ex-ante uncertainty and underpricing. 13 However, due to the nature of RBIPOs and Australian institutional features, many of the traditional proxies are not applicable or available. Consequently, we focus on two ex-ante risk measures in this study, the standard deviation of aftermarket returns and the period of subscription. The standard deviation of aftermarket returns is often used as a proxy for exante uncertainty. finds that riskier firms experience greater variation in aftermarket returns measured by the standard deviation of short-term returns. In contrast, an Australian study by does not find a relationship between initial performance and the risk of the issue, when proxied by standard deviation. This inconsistency in results is curious and the results of Finn and Higham may possibly be explained by the fact that their sample consists of a small homogeneous group of industrial firms examined over a short time period. Such sample selection may have led to relatively common factors being fairly uniform in behaviour and hence, the prospect of the standard deviation measure as being an active discriminator may be considered low.
The period of subscription is used as a risk proxy in four Australian studies, , How, Izan and Monroe (1995) , Lee, Taylor and Walter (1996) and How (2000) . The empirical adoption of the period of subscription as a risk proxy was adapted from Rock's theoretical model, where it proxies for the level of informed demand. Rock (1986) suggests that the proxy might capture the extent to which rationing 'crowds out' uninformed investors from issues that are most likely to be significantly underpriced. This leads to the prediction that issues that are filled or sold more quickly experience the highest level of informed demand and are therefore more likely to be underpriced 14 and implies that a negative relationship exists between the period of subscription and the level of underpricing. measure the period of subscription as the time lapsed between the date subscription opens and the date of listing, whereas Lee, Taylor and Walter (1996) , How, Izan and Monroe (1995) and How (2000) consider the time between the date the prospectus was registered and the date of listing. Ideally, the period of subscription should be measured from the date subscriptions open to the date that full subscription is reached. The use of the date of listing as a proxy for full subscription overstates the period of subscription, as full subscription should be achieved by the time the offer closes.
Thus, the prior Australian studies overstate the period of subscription but Lee, Taylor and Walter (1996) , How, Izan and Monroe (1995) and How (2000) overstate it further by the use of the date the prospectus is registered as a proxy for the opening of subscriptions. These studies provide mixed evidence of the relationship between underpricing and the period of subscription. Finn and Higham find a weak negative relationship. In contrast, Lee, Taylor and Walter (1996) , How, Izan and Monroe (1995) and How (2000) find a significant negative relationship which is consistent with Rock (1986) . However, the variation in empirical results might be explained by differences in the measurement of the subscription period proxy or the sample itself.
Firm Size
The use of firm size as a risk factor stems from the seasoned equity evidence where smaller firms earn higher returns than larger firms. 15 The observed relationship between firm size and IPO underpricing differs across studies. A significant size effect is identified in Logue (1973) , , Beatty and Ritter (1986) for U.S. IPOs. This association is also found in Little (1987) and for Australian IPOs. In contrast, Block and Stanley (1980) for U.S. IPOs and Finn and Higham (1988) and How, Izan and Monroe (1995) for Australian IPOs, show a weak negative relationship. However, How (2000) does not find that issue size matters. These studies differ in terms of sampling technique and the period of study.
Changing Risk Hypothesis
The sample consists of both industrial and RBIPOs and provides evidence of an industry effect where high average initial returns during hot markets appear to be associated with non-stationarity in the initial returns of natural resource issues. suggests that underwriters exploit start-up resource firms during the oil and gas booms by excessively underpricing these issues, thus fueling a speculative rise in the market for new resource issues. It is also observed that hot market periods are followed by a significant and prolonged increase in the number of new IPOs (see Ibbotson & Jaffe 1975; Loughran, Ritter & Rydqvist 1994) . To control for such variation in IPO markets, the proportion of resource listings relative to total listings over the period is included in the model (PROP). This proxy explicitly controls for the changing risk hypothesis by including the number of resource listings in the numerator standardised by the total number of new listings. Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist (1994) and predict a positive association between the proportion of resource listings relative to total listings and the level of underpricing. This is confirmed for samples of new listings.
Resource Risk Factors
In relation to RBIPOs, ex-ante uncertainty can also be characterised in terms of the change in underlying commodity prices, the nature of the firm's mining activities (exploration or production) and the number of minerals explored for or produced (a measure of the firm's diversification in mining activities).
The linkage between commodity prices and risk, measured by uncertainty with respect to firm value, has been explored by Sim and Jeffery (1990) . They find that increased volatility of commodity prices results in increased volatility in the revenues of the firm, which in turn, leads to more volatile share returns. Higher volatility implies a positive relationship between underlying commodity variance and underpricing. Further, the nature of the firm's mining activities is related to risk as exploration firms are more speculative than producer firms by nature. Explorers have little or no income until resources are discovered and mined. As a result, there is higher uncertainty in relation to the amount and timing of the returns. It is therefore expected that exploration firms are significantly riskier than producer firms resulting in a positive prediction between exploration activities and the level of underpricing.
In addition, management may wish to ensure stability in cash flows. Thus, rather than exposing cash flows from operations to one particular commodity, there may be diversification and /or synergistic benefits in mining more than one type of commodity. Consequently, a negative relationship between the number of minerals and the level of underpricing is inferred.
The next section provides details on the sample investigated and method adopted in this study.
Data and Method
The pricing of RBIPOs is examined over the period March 1983 to January 1990. During this period 240 RBIPOs were observed. However due to difficulties in obtaining prospectus documents and after accounting for unsuccessful offers and unavailable share price information, the final sample examined was reduced to 168 firms (70% of the population). Prospectuses were obtained from various donor libraries, accounting firms, merchant banks and stockbroking companies. A number of indices were used including the Australian All Ordinaries Accumulated Index (overall market index) and All Resources Index (consisting of the top 30% of all resource firms by market capitalisation). Share prices and the indices were sourced from the Australian Stock Exchange Database held in the School of Banking & Finance, University of New South Wales. Where initial trading day prices were not captured on this database in the earlier years of the sample, prices were sourced manually from the Australian Financial Review.
We refer to the level of underpricing or the initial trading day (raw) return as the difference between the closing price on the first day of trading and the subscription price divided by the subscription price. Similarly, the market adjusted return adjusts the initial trading day return by the change in the market index between subscription and listing. Both raw and market adjusted abnormal returns are estimated on a daily basis. The raw return for each IPO in the sample is given by:
where: RET n = the return on day n; P n = the closing price on day n; and P n-1 = the closing price on day n-1.
The market adjusted return is calculated as:
where: I n = the closing value of the index on day n; and I n-1 = the closing value of the index on day n-1.
The average daily return is calculated on an equally weighted basis across all the firms in the sample.
-326 -Patterns in the level of underpricing across time using subjective visual identification have been previously adopted (see . We explicitly recognise by employing the switching regression technique developed by Goldfeld and Quandt (1972) , the existence of cycles in the initial returns over time. This technique allows an examination of temporal variability in the parameters of an equation without imposing a set of prior beliefs as to when a change in cycle occurs. Further details of the switching regression technique are provided in appendix A.
The relationship between risk and underpricing across the entire period, as well as within the identified sub-periods is evaluated using multivariate regression analysis. The proxies for the traditional and resource-specific risk factors are measured as follows. The proxies for ex-ante uncertainty used in this study are the standard deviation of aftermarket returns and the period of subscription. 16 The standard deviation of raw aftermarket returns (STD) is estimated over the first 20 daily returns after listing. The period of subscription (POS) is measured as the time interval between the opening and closing of subscriptions as specified in the prospectus. Where the closing date for subscriptions is unspecified, the date of listing is used. The proxies for size used in this study include the total dollar value of the offer (EQR) 17 , the initial value of the firm (IFV) 18 and total assets at the time of listing (TA). 19 The proxy for the changing risk composition hypothesis is the proportion of RBIPOs to total listings over the sample (PROP) measured as the number of RBIPOs divided by the total number of IPOs for a given month of listing.
The resource-specific proxies adopted include the volatility of underlying commodity prices, an indicator variable capturing the nature of the firm's mining activities as an explorer or producer and the number of minerals explored for or produced. To measure the underlying commodity price change for each firm (CP), the commodities explored or produced were identified directly from the prospectus. The average weekly change in the price 20 of the commodity explored or produced is calculated for three months prior to listing. Where more than one commodity was explored or produced, an equally weighted average of the commodity price change across commodities is used. Commodity prices were sourced from a variety of publications namely: the International Monetary Statistics produced by the International Monetary Fund; the Energy Statistics Sourcebook; Metal Statistics, the purchasing guide of the American Metal Industry; the Commodity Yearbook and Metal and Mineral Statistics for the period 1981-90. The explorer or producer indicator variable (EP =1 for a producer, else 0 for an explorer) is based on details provided in the prospectus and whether revenue was generated from mining activities. Lastly, the number of metals and minerals that the firm is involved with is adopted as a proxy for the level of commodity diversification (DIV). These factors and their expected influence on the level of underpricing is summarised in table 1.
16. Due to the nature of RBIPOs and Australian institutional features, many of the traditional proxies are not applicable or available. The number of uses of funds raised is not reported consistently throughout the sample period, as pre 1991 there was no specific disclosure requirement for speculative firms in Australia. Similarly, age as a risk proxy is a problematic variable for RBIPOs, as the majority of the sample (some 57%) are essentially start-ups with little or no operating or trading history. Consequently, the age variable is unlikely to capture any systematic variation for risk. The level of market ebullience is not considered as a separate variable in this study, as the level of market activity is endogenised within the Goldfeld and Quandt switching regression. Growth opportunities are also excluded as they cannot be easily measured for start-up firms with little or no trading history. Growth opportunities are usually measured as one minus the ratio of net tangible assets per share to the subscription price. As many resource stock have no or few tangible assets, this results in an incomplete data set for the sample. 17. Defined as the total number of shares in the issue multiplied by the initial issue price. Used by Logue (1973) , Beatty and Ritter (1986) , , How, Izan and Monroe (1995) . An inverse measure is used by Beatty and Ritter (1986) and Little (1987) . 18. Defined as the total number of shares on issue after the IPO multiplied by the initial subscription price.
Used by , How, Izan and Monroe (1995). 19. See Block and Stanley (1980) and Lee, Taylor and Walter (1996) . 20. Daily price data was not available for all the commodities over the sample period.
Table 1 Predicted Influence of Variables on the Level of Underpricing
Standard deviation of returns is estimated by the standard deviation of daily returns from day 1 to day 20 in the after-market (STD). Period of subscription (POS) is measured as the number of days between the opening and closing of subscriptions as specified in the prospectus. Where the closing date for subscriptions is unspecified, the date of listing is used. Firm size is measured as the value of equity raised (the number of shares in the IPO valued at the subscription price (EQR)), total assets prior to listing (TA) and the post listing number of shares on issue valued at the subscription price (IFV). The proportion of RBIPOs to total listings is the number of RBIPOs divided by the total number of IPOs for a given month of listing. Commodity price change is the average percentage change in the weekly price 21 of the commodity explored or produced over the three months before the listing (CP). Where more than one commodity was explored or produced, an equally weighted average of the commodity price change is used. The nature of activities is an indicator variable and is one when the resource-based IPO is a producer and zero when the resource-based IPO is classified as an explorer. This classification is based on details provided in the prospectus and whether revenue was generated from mining activities (EP).The level of commodity diversification is proxied by the number of minerals explored/produced as stated in the prospectus (DIV).
Variable
Predicted Sign with Underpricing 
Empirical Results
Descriptive Statistics
The sample consists of 168 RBIPOs of which 16 are producers and 152 are explorers based upon the description of the nature of activities in the prospectus. The majority of new issues (67.3%) were listed in the years 1986 and 1987, with August 1987 representing the peak (mode) in the number of firms seeking listing (6.5%). Figure 1 reports the number of RBIPOs and the level of the stock market as given by the All Ordinaries and the All Resources Accumulation Indices over the sample period. A tendency for high trading volumes to be associated with market peaks is present which is consistent with international evidence in Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist (1994) . The increase in the number of new RBIPOs suggests that many resource firms took advantage of the increase in demand for shares by investors and the general level of rising prices in the bull market to raise new equity.
21. Daily price data was not available for all the commodities over the sample period. The standard deviation of raw after-market returns, STD, varied across the IPOs from 1% to 24.12% with a mean of 6.39%. The time taken for the issue to sell the issue, POS, ranged from 4 days to 123 days, with an average period of subscription of 33.07 days. 22 Additionally, 56% of all resource issues were able to successfully raise the minimum subscription value within the first month and a further 32% within two months. The sample investigated exhibits a wide range in firm size, measured in terms of the dollar value of equity raised (EQR), total assets, (TA) and the initial value of the firm (IFV) (based on the total number of shares on issue at the time of listing) (refer to table 2). The average equity raised accounts for -329 -22. In comparison, for an industrial sample, Lee, Taylor and Walter (1996) found a range of 17 to 191 days and an average of 52.8 days. However, Lee, Taylor and Walter (1996) have overstated the period of subscription by measuring the time interval between the date of registration and the date of listing rather than the date subscriptions open and the date subscriptions closed.
A$9.07M with total assets prior to listing of A$5.48M and post listing initial firm value of approximately A$25M. However most of the issues are small (some 63%), raising between A$1-5M (in 1990 dollars) and an additional 13.7% raising less that A$1M. The proportion of resource to total IPOs, PROP, ranges from 6% to 100% in the month of listing with a mean of 35%. The average commodity price change, CP, is 0.07% ranging from -3.59% to 1.98%. 11.3% of the RBIPOs had no assets at the time of listing and were explorers who intended to use the funds raised to explore a previously worked mine. The average number of minerals or metals explored is 1.76, ranging from 1 to a maximum of 8. Descriptive statistics previously reported in table 2 have been disaggregated according to explorer and producer sub-samples in table 3. Differences in the means between these classifications are examined using the standard t-test and the non-parametric Mann-Whitney U test. The explorer subset are associated with smaller issue size (in terms of the dollar value of the equity raised and initial firm value). The average issue size is A$6.5M and the initial firm value is A$12.3M for explorers relative to A$34.2M and A$146.3M for producers respectively. Of the explorers, 80% of the sample raised less than A$5M compared to 44% of producers. Furthermore, explorers take a longer time to sell their issues and on average, were able to achieve full subscription after 34.42 days, compared with producers of 22.12 days. Theoretical predictions of Rock (1986) suggest that riskier issues (i.e. issues made by explorers) should be sold more expediently. However, we observe contrary to Rock's theoretical prediction that producers fill their offers faster than explorers, despite the larger amount of equity raised. A possible explanation for this result is that producers are generally reputable and have higher cash flows. Consequently, it is conceivable that these offerings are accepted faster by discerning potential subscribers. In all other respects, the sub-sample for explorers and producers was not significantly different from each other in terms of the standard deviation of after-market returns, total assets, the proportion of resource listings to total listings at the time of issue, commodity price change or the level of diversification of firm activities. Note: a Significant at the 1% level; and b Significant at the 5% level.
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Underpricing
For the sample, the average underpricing or day 1 average raw abnormal return is 48.45%, which is significantly different from zero at the 1% level. This finding is consistent with earlier research, suggesting that most offers in Australia and internationally are underpriced. 23. In terms of the types of commodities involved, the firms in the sample were engaged in the exploration and production of some 35 metals and minerals. There is an overwhelming interest in gold with 59% of the sample involved solely in gold production and/or exploration and a further 27% involved in gold and other metal production and/or exploration. The exploration/production of gold accounts for 88.7% of the total sample followed by silver (13.6%), copper (13.4%), platinum (11.9%), oil and gas (8.3%) and zinc (6.5%) .The majority of firms are effectively non-diversified (65% of the explorers and 68% of the producers), that is, the revenues generated by the firm are solely subject to the commodity price movements of one commodity. 24. The returns are adjusted by various market indices used to proxy overall market performance including the All Ordinaries Index, the All Resource Index and the All Metals Index. While all initial adjusted returns are significant, the choice of index does not seem to have a marked effect on the level of returns. Interestingly, industrial IPOs do not have a significantly lower standard deviation than resource issues, 27 but do exhibit greater positive skewness in all years other than 1985. These results contrast Ball and Brown (1980) and Beedles (1986) finding of higher levels of positive skewness and non-systematic risk for seasoned resource firms.
Analysing the data by year, the level of average underpricing across the sectors is statistically different. Industrial IPOs experience higher levels of underpricing than RBIPOs in 1984 RBIPOs in , 1986 RBIPOs in and 1988 28 but lower underpricing in the 25. The data reported for industrial IPOs is derived from a sub-sample of all IPOs listing from 1983 to June 1995 in Woo (2000) . 26. The resource-based underpriced group has average abnormal returns of 83.07% compared with -20.78%
for the overpriced group. The industrial underpriced group has average abnormal returns of 67.58% compared with -24.42% for the overpriced group. 27. The F statistic is 0.73 which is insignificant at the 1% level. 28. Significant at the 1% level.
hot market of 1987. The results are in contrast to examining U.S. IPOs over the period [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] , where resource and industrial IPOs experienced similar levels of average underpricing except in periods of hot markets where resource issues experienced significantly higher levels of underpricing.
In addition, the distribution of industrial and resource-based IPO underpricing is compared prior to and after the 1987 stock market crash in table 5. T and Mann Whitney U statistics are used to identify whether means differ between industrial and RBIPOs. Examining, the pre-1987 stock market crash sub-period indicates no statistical difference between the level of underpricing for resource-based and industrial IPOs. Yet in the post crash sub-period, industrial IPOs have significantly higher levels of underpricing than RBIPOs, which is significant at the 1% level. 29 Further, RBIPOs exhibit considerable differences in average underpricing prior to, and, after the 1987 stock market crash. 30 RBIPOs are underpriced on average by 56% before the 1987 stock market crash and are overpriced by 17% afterwards. When we compare relative performance of a comparable sample of industrial IPOs, there is a weak statistical difference measured by the Mann Whitney U statistic at the 10% level between pre and post-crash underpricing, where the pre-crash 29. The t statistic is 3.30 which is significantly different from zero at the 1% level. 30. The t statistic to test the differences in the level of returns is 5.15 and the U statistic is 4.09. Both statistics are significantly different from zero at the 1% level.
underpricing is 45% and the post-crash level of underpricing is 34% for industrial firms. This result shows a substantial underpricing difference exists across the pre versus post crash period. The average level of underpricing is also compared across explorer and producer sub-samples in table 6. Explorer-based IPOs experienced higher underpricing of 50.71% compared to 26.98% for producer-based IPOs. However differences across the sample means is statistically insignificant. These findings are contrary to expectations that as explorers are riskier than producers, they should be associated with higher levels of underpricing. However, our insights are limited by the fact that the number of producers in the sample is relatively small and the fact that explorers exhibit both a higher standard deviation and greater positive skewness of returns than producers. fig. 2 ). A period of mainly negative initial returns from March 1983 to November 1986 32 (59.8% of issues overpriced) is followed by a period of positive initial returns from December 1986 to October 1987 (88.4% of issues underpriced), and, subsequent to the share market crash from November 1987, a limited number of listings was observed bearing mostly negative returns (77.8% of issues overpriced). Where: P n is the closing price on day n, the first day of listing; and P n-1 is the subscription price.
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To overcome the subjective nature of visual inspection, a switching regression was estimated to objectively identify changes in the average level of underpricing (referred to as switch points) over the sample period. The results of the switching regression are shown in table 7. This technique firstly assumes that only one switch point exists (that there exists two clearly identifiable regimes or periods) and estimates the demarcation point between the regimes using the method outlined in appendix 1. If this switch point is significantly different from zero, then the procedure considers the potential that two switch points exist. The procedure is re-estimated and examined and subsequent switch points are added until the addition of the latest switch point is insignificantly different from zero. Operating under the assumption of one switch point, January 1987 is identified as the first demarcation point. Further examination assuming two switch points (or three regimes) reveals the same first switch point as that found under the single switch assumption, and a second switch point at November 1987. The possibility of further switching points was tested but no additional points were found. The changes from one regime to another are instantaneous as indicated by the insignificance of Φ 1 and Φ 2 . Consequently, the Goldfeld and Quandt (1972) switching regression has revealed three distinct regimes or periods in the sample that correspond to March 1983 to December 1986 , January 1987 to October 1987 and November 1987 to January 1990 . Table 8 presents the average underpricing for each regime as identified by the switching regression. The observed cycles in the level of underpricing (referred to as hot issues) are also found in international evidence examining IPOs in the United States, United Kingdom, Singapore and Germany (amongst other countries).
33 Despite these cycles, the correlation of market performance and the level of underpricing is surprisingly low. The correlation of 0.19 (0.25) between the average monthly return on the All Ordinaries Accumulation Index (Resource Accumulation Index) and the level of underpricing over the sample period may be attributed to the fact that the market indices are only 'representative' and consist mainly of large seasoned firms rather than new listings. Further, the resource sector constitutes only 30% (approx.) of the All Ordinaries index.
33. See Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist (1994) .
Table 8 Estimated Initial Returns for Each Switching Regime
Underpricing is measured as the raw return on the first day of listing for regimes identified from the switching regression results reported in table 7. The difference in the means cross regimes is measured by the t and Mann Whitney-U statistic.
Regime
Average Note: a Significant at the 1% level; and b Significant at the 5% level.
Multivariate Regression Analysis
The decomposition of the sample period into sub-periods permits us to explore what factors drive the level of underpricing within cycles. The proxies used have been described in section 3. In table 9, the relationship between the risk proxies and underpricing is given by the correlation matrix. The direction of the correlation between underpricing and all of the variables excluding the proportion of resource to total listings is as hypothesised in table 1. The resource-specific proxy, the average commodity price change, CP, is significantly positively related to underpricing. In addition, the resource-specific proxies that indicate whether the issuer is an explorer or producer, EP, and the number of minerals mined, DIV, both have a negative relationship with the standard deviation of after-market returns, STD, as hypothesised. 35 In terms of the traditional risk variables, there is significant negative correlation between underpricing and the period of subscription, POS, which is consistent with the findings of How (2000) . The additional resource-specific proxy, the proportion of resource to total listings, PROP, is significantly negatively related to underpricing which is opposite to the predictions of and Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist (1994) . Univariate regression results, not reported here, also confirm the ex-ante predictions between underpricing and the risk variables for all but PROP. Table 10 presents the multivariate regression results for the entire sample period. Corrections for heteroscedasticity using the heteroscedastic-consistent covariance matrix devised by White (1980) are used. As the various size proxies are highly correlated, separate regressions for each proxy were run. Only the results for the amount of equity raised (EQR) are presented as the other two proxies yield similar results.
34. One of the IPOs listing in Aug 1985 has a highly positive return. When it is removed from the calculation of the average return, the regime average return decreases to 5.68%. 35. Producers are associated with a lower standard deviation of returns and firms that mined a higher number of minerals are associated with a lower standard deviation. The variable with the highest explanatory power in Regression I is the change in commodity prices, CP, which is positively associated with underpricing at the 1% level of significance. The period of subscription, POS, variable is negatively associated with the level of underpricing and significant at the 10% level. This result is consistent with Rock's model where rationing crowds out uninformed investors from issues that significantly underpriced. Furthermore, the result is consistent with the Australian results of How, Izan and Monroe (1995) , Lee, Taylor and Walter (1996) and How (2000) . There is also evidence of a size effect (significant at the 10% level) consistent with How, Izan and Monroe (1995) . However, Lee, Taylor and Walter (1996) do not find evidence of a size effect for industrial listings and How (2000) for resource listings. The proportion of resource to total listings, PROP, is significantly negatively associated with the level of underpricing (at the 10% level) which is contrary to and Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist (1994) . However, our divergent results may be due to our sample of resource based firms whereas other studies have examined samples of both resource and industrial listings.
The explanatory power of the standard deviation of after-market returns, STD, is low, in contrast with and How, Izan and Monroe (1995) . These studies find a stronger relationship between the standard deviation of after-market returns and the level of underpricing. It appears the low explanatory power is due to the relatively compressed distribution for the standard deviation of after-market returns (Φ= 3.34) which is also found in . Finally, the additional resource-specific proxies, explorer/producer, EP, and number of minerals explored or produced, DIV, do not provide significant explanatory power.
36
Regressions II, III and IV in table 11 examine the nature of the relationship between underpricing and the risk proxies in each of the identified regimes found using the switching regression technique. In addition, the impact of the share market crash on the level of underpricing can be observed when comparing Regression IV and V results. In these regressions, it is observed that the level of significance and the direction of influence for risk proxies varies across regimes. In Regime I ( represented in Regression II), four variables are significant, the commodity price change CP, the period of subscription POS, the amount of equity raised EQR and the proportion of resource to total listings PROP. Of these, the first three variables are of the hypothesised sign. However, Regime II ( in Regression III) does not yield any significant variables capable of explaining the level of underpricing. Finally, Regime III ( in Regression IV) identifies three significant variables at the 10% level, the standard deviation of after-market returns STD which is correctly signed, the firm size measured by EQR yields results opposite to initial predictions and the proportion of resource to total listings PROP which is found to be negatively 36. In addition, as suggested by a reviewer, the return on the market (proxied by the All Ordinaries index and the All Resources index) between the subscription and listing date was included as an explanatory variable in the regression equation. However, the coefficient of the return on the market variable was insignificant. 37. This variable is excluded as all firms in this period were explorers. related to underpricing. However, the results for the third regime should be interpreted with caution as they are based on a small sample size.
Regression V examines the impact of both Regime I and II, constituting the pre-stock market crash period. These results can be compared with the post-crash result of Regression IV already discussed. The results of Regression V echo those in Regression I, namely that commodity price change, CP, period of subscription, POS, and, firm size, EQR, are significant explanators of the level of underpricing in the predicted direction. 38 Overall, it appears that the level of underpricing across all sub-periods is not influenced by whether the firm is a producer or an explorer nor in terms of the level of diversification of the firm's activities. Parties that price RBIPOs seem to take into account however, expected subscription periods, issue size, the commodity price change and the proportion of resource to total listings when setting the offer price. The null results shown in Regime II are hardly surprising in that prior literature suggests that in very hot markets, at least, issues can be heavily underpriced without heeding fundamental firm valuation.
Conclusion
Prior IPO research suggests that the level of IPO underpricing depends on traditional risk proxies such as age, firm size and uncertainty. Tests of the changing risk composition hypothesis as identified in also suggest that hot markets are associated with large numbers of highly speculative RBIPOs flooding the market simultaneously. This research provides further evidence of the underpricing phenomenon in Australia as it relates to RBIPOs. Specifically, RBIPOs are, on average less underpriced (or experience similar underpricing) than industrial IPOs in each of the years of the sample period March 1983 to January 1990 except for the hot market of 1987, where RBIPOs experienced higher level of underpricing.
Changes in market cycles were detected by a Goldfeld & Quant switching regression. Over the sample period, three distinct regimes are identified, a period of mainly negative initial returns (March 1983 to December 1986), a period of positive initial returns (January 1987 to October 1987 and then negative returns (November 1987 to January 1990 . For each regime, multiple regressions adopting traditional risk variables and a proxy for the changing risk hypothesis (the proportion of resource to total listings) are estimated. These factors are augmented by three additional industry-risk variables which capture the extent to which underlying commodity prices vary, the nature of activities (explorer versus producer) and the level of diversified activities of the firm. Overall, the regression results indicate that large commodity price changes have a strong positive correlation with underpricing levels across the entire sample period and in Regime I (cooler markets), suggesting that riskiness in the physical commodity market is accounted for when pricing new resource issues. Also, during the entire sample period and cool markets, the proportion of resource to total listings is negatively related to the level of underpricing.
In terms of traditional risk proxies for the entire sample period and cooler periods, the period of subscription (indicates the speed at which the issue sold) is 38. The results are not sensitive to outliers or the use of market adjusted returns to measure underpricing. negatively associated with underpricing in Regime I. Further, larger RBIPOs are found to be less underpriced than smaller issues in Regime I, but positively related in Regime III. The latter results may be explained by the fact that after the stock market crash, only larger higher-quality issues were capable of successfully raising equity capital.
It seems that the nature of the firm's activities as an explorer or producer and the level of diversification of the firm have no statistically significant impact on the level of underpricing over the sample period. For cooler periods, the standard deviation of after-market returns have no explanatory power in Regime I and little power (significant at the 10% level) in Regime III. However, during the hot market period (Regime II), no variable entering in the regressions is statistically significant, implying that the level of underpricing is not systematically related to any predicted influence (traditional, changing risk hypothesis or specific resourceindustry). Overall, the results indicate that during cooler market cycles, some traditional risk factors are priced, but, for hot market periods, the level of underpricing for Australian RBIPOs appears unrelated to predicted risk proxies. 
Appendix A Switching Regression Technique
A generalised approach to the switching regression technique as developed by Goldfeld and Quandt (1972, p 263) This procedure presumes that if z i is greater than its unknown cutoff value, regime 1 holds whereas if z i is less than the cutoff value then regime 2 holds. In its stated form, A-3 might be considered as a regression with n observations from which n+6 parameters must be estimated, namely a 1 , b 1 , Φ 
